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WARRANTIES OF TITLE -

A MODEST PROPOSAL

LEONARD LEVINt

I.

INTRODUCTION

M

UCH CONFUSION and uncertainty attend the question of
the responsibility of a grantor of land for defects in the title to
the land conveyed. The confusion and uncertainty stem from the fact
that courts historically have approached the problem with an attitude
based on antiquated legal concepts. These concepts often
subordinate both the intent of the parties involved and the practical
realities of the situation to the dictates of legal formalism. Courts
which achieve reasonable results within this framework frequently do
so only by distorting the prevailing legal concepts beyond the point at
which they have any real meaning. For example, courts typically
make recovery for defective title dependent upon whether the plaintiff's possessory rights to the property are presently interfered with.
To reach the desired result of affording a remedy to the titleholder,
courts bound by the "present interference" requirement frequently go
far to find a "constructive interference," even though the plaintiff has
at all times retained actual possession.'
In recent years the number of cases involving warranties of title
appears to have declined significantly. As a result, the need for reform in this area of law has not been perceived as pressing. It is suggested, however, that the decline in the volume of suits is not
reflective of any improvement in the law. Rather, the decline is attributable to the wider use of prophylactic measures employed pursuant to the title transfer. Professional title searches, which detect
defects in title before transfer, and the growing practice of purchasing
title insurance, under the terms of which the insurer or its agents conduct a title search prior to land transfers, are two common prophylact Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law. B.S., University of
Pennsylvania, 1948; J.D., University of Pennsylvania, 1950.
1. See, e.g., Brown v. Lober, 63 Ill. App. 3d 727, 379 N.E.2d 1354 (1978) (it is not
necessary to show an actual eviction to prove breach of a covenant of quiet enjoyment); Foley v. Smith, 14 Wash. App. 285, 539 P.2d 874 (1975) (where vendor sold
land to purchasers, a subsequent judgment for specific performance by prior purchasers constituted breach of vendor's covenant to purchasers); Brewster v. Hines, 155 W.
Va. 302, 185 S.E.2d 513 (1971) (purchaser of land may sustain burden of proving
constructive eviction from land by proving that the deed from the vendor passed no
legal title and that purchaser surrendered possession to persons holding superior
title).

(649)

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1984

1

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [1984], Art. 2
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29: p. 649

tic measures. When such precautions are taken, litigation is seldom
necessary if problems ultimately arise between title companies inter
se.2 Instead, the company which initially insured the title typically
acknowledges liability to subsequent insurers for defects which later
surface. However, such measures are not used universally, and the
confused law of warranties continues to pose a problem for recent
cases not solved between title companies. This pragmatic approach
employed by the title companies has many positive aspects, and the
changes herein proposed in the manner in which title defect disputes
are to be solved are in many ways similar.
The purpose of this article is twofold: first, to survey the origins
and sources of the present confusion in the courts; second, to recommend a body of basic considerations, in the form of a proposed legislative enactment, to which courts may refer in order to reach results
which are more consistent with both industry practice and the expectations of the parties. Thus it is hoped that a realistic and internally
consistent body of law may develop to deal with the problems certain
to arise in the future.
II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The doctrine of caveat emptor, prevalent in so many other areas of
the law involving sales, historically has had little application in allocating the responsibility for defects in title between a grantor of land
and his successor. In feudal times, the overlord's responsibility for his
tenants' undertakings included his warranty of the land under tenure.
If the overlord's title to the land proved defective, he was obligated to
3
supply the tenant with either alternative land or its value.
As the feudal era came to an end, growing dissatisfaction with
that system's form of redress for title defects, replete with procedural
delays and inconveniences, ripened into a demand for a new system.
It seems natural, then, that when the written form of conveyance became dominant, the express covenant of title became common. 4 First
2. Taub, Rights andRemedies Under a Tile Pohiy, 15 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J.
422 (1980). The author notes that most claims against title insurance companies are
settled without litigation. Id at 428.
3. See generally 3 American Law of Property § 12.125 (A. Casner ed. 1952)
(superceded) (citing W.H. RAWLE, COVENANTS FOR TITLE (5th ed. 1887)). The
overlord's obligation to supply either alternative land or its value served a twofold
purpose. In the first case, this obligation protected the tenant from paramount title
of others. Moreover, this obligation protected the tenant against any attempt by his
overlord to take back what he had parted with. Id
For a classic history of the law of covenants for title, see W.H. RAWLE, COVENANTS FOR TITLE (2d ed. 1854).
4. See generally C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO REAL PROPERTY (1962).
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introduced in the latter part of the seventeenth century, express covenants of title soon became a routine part of land coveyances.5 Gradually the character of the grantor's covenant assumed a stylized form
which included the five customary covenants of title.6 Three of the
customary covenants were denominated warranties in presenli; any
breach of their terms was deemed to occur upon delivery of the deed.
Warranties 1n presenui included the covenant of seisin, 7 which was
breached when the grantor at the time of the conveyance owned an
interest in the property less extensive than that which he purported to
convey by the deed. 8 The other two warranties bh presenti were the
warranty that the grantor had legal authority to convey the interest
purported to be conveyed, and the warranty that the title was subject
5. W.H. RAWLE, supra note 3, at 43.

6. Id. The five covenants include: (1) a covenant for seisin; (2) a covenant that
the grantor has a perfect right to transfer the property; (3) a covenant for quiet enjoyment; (4) a covenant against encumbrances; and (5) a covenant for further assurance.
Id

7. Courts have recognized the lack of a uniform definition of the term "seisin."
See, e.g., Lakelands, Inc. v. Chippewa & Flambeau Improvement Co., 237 Wisc. 326,
342, 295 N.W. 919, 926 (1941)("One can wade in the sea of adjudicated cases in
order to discover what is meant by 'seisin' until he is totally submerged and lost").
Dean Cribbet has attempted to define seisin as a mythical concept which carries with
it something greater than possession. See J.E. CRIBBET, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
PROPERTY 14-15 (2d ed. 1975). He illustrates the concept by stating that
the early English landholder seldom was thought of as owning the land,
rather he was seised of it. The protected interest of value to him was his
seisin. When he transferred his interest he did so by "livery of seisin," accomplished by going on the land and physically transferring a clod of earth
or a twig to the new holder of the land. If an intruder ousted him from the
land, he was said to have been disseised and until he re-entered the land,
either by self help or by the appropriate legal remedy, he had lost his seisin.
This could be disastrous since, if the original holder of the land died without regaining his seisin, the land did not descend to his heirs, while on the
death of the disseisor the seisin would go to the latter's heirs by "descent
cast."
Id. at 14.
As used in a covenant, the term "seisin" is generally construed to mean that the
grantor is seised of legal title. 20 AM. JUR. 2D Covenants, Conditzons, Etc. § 73 (1965).
8. See generally 20 AM. JUR. 2D Covenants, Conditons, Etc. §§ 73 & 75 (1965). Seisin
connotes something more than possession. Hence, mere possession of the property by
a covenantor is not sufficient to satisfy the covenant. Id § 75. The covenant of seisin
is deemed to have been breached by the mere existence of an outstanding paramount
title. See, e.g., Hilliker v. Rueger, 28 N.Y. 11, 126 N.E. 266 (1920) (defining the covenant of seisin to mean that the grantor at the time of the conveyance was lawfully
seised of an absolute and indefeasable estate of inheritance in fee simple, and had the
power to convey the same; the covenant can be broken by failure of marketable title);
Litman's v. O'Donnell, 173 Pa. Super. 570, 98 A.2d 462 (1953) (covenant is breached
if there is an existing encumbrance at the time the deed is delivered). But cf. Marathon Builders v. Polinger, 263 Md. 410, 283 A.2d 617 (1971) (zoning restriction does
not constitute an encumbrance on the land); Len v. Burke, 231 Pa. Super. 98, 331
A.2d 755 (1974)(possibility of future assessment where assessment has not yet been
made is not an encumbrance even though local improvements have been completed).
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only to those encumbrances disclosed on the face of the deed. 9 In
addition to the warranties in presentl4 there were two customary warranties infuturo which were not breached, and with regard to which
no cause of action accrued, unless and until some triggering event
occurred after the conveyance. 10 The warranties tn futuro were the
warranty of quiet enjoyment, also called the "covenant of warranty," 1 and the warranty of further assurances. The warranty of
quiet enjoyment was deemed breached when the grantee's use or enjoyment of the land was interfered with in fact or disturbed by a
claim of an adverse interest. The warranty of further assurances required that the grantor take any necessary steps to protect the
grantee's title against adverse claimants.12 As these five covenants became increasingly standardized through custom and usage, their in3
clusion in deeds to land which was sold became the rule.'
During the latter part of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, the legislatures of most states undertook to simplify and systematize land conveyances. A 1909 Pennsylvania statute
is in many ways typical of these early legislative ventures.' 4 Under
this statute, deeds were separated into three types according to the
specific language used in the deed. For example, a grantor could simply convey that which he held, without undertaking any responsibility at all, by denominating the deed a quitclaim.1 5 There is case law
9. W.H. RAWLE, supra note 3, at 44.
10. See id.
11. For a general discussion of the covenant of warranty, see 20 AM. JUR. 2D,
Covenants, Conditions, Etc. § 50 (1965). The covenant of warranty is a promise by the
warrantor that upon the failure of the title which the deed purported to convey,
either in part or for the whole estate, the warrantor will make compensation for the
loss sustained. Id.
12. Id § 108. The effect of a covenant for further assurance is that the grantor
obligates himself to perform all acts, deeds, conveyances, and assurances as shall be
lawfully and reasonably required by the grantee to perfect or confirm the title. Id.
However, as this covenant applies only to the estate granted, it does not apply to
defects over which the vendor has no control. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Darby, 26 Mo.
517 (1858) (covenant for further assurances embraces only those encumbrances over
which the vendor has control; where the defect is beyond the control of the vendor,
such as where there is an outstanding mortgage created by the vendor's grantor, the
vendor is not liable on his covenant for further assurance). So construed, those obligations seem to fit the definition of what has been denominated a special warranty
deed rather than a general one.
13. See, e.g., LeRoy v. Beard, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 451 (1850) (by the 19th century,
the custom of including warranties in deeds was so clearly established that the authority of an agent to convey carried with it the power to bind his principal to the
obligations of a warranty deed).
14. See PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 (Purdon 1955). The three types of deeds
provided for by the Pennsylvania statute are general warranty deeds, special warranty deeds, and quitclaim deeds. 21 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5-7 (Purdon 1955).
15. 21 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7 (Purdon 1955). Although the language of the
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(although not without a strong minority view)' 6 which indicates that
the grantee under a quitclaim deed not only had no rights for defects
in title as against the grantor, but was also precluded from asserting
any rights based upon reliance on clear title. Thus, by both statutes
and the common law of many states, a grantor under a quitclaim
17
deed has not even been protected by recording statutes.
The Pennsylvania statute also provided for the "special warranty
statute itself appears overly complex, the basic distinguishing characteristic of a quitclaim deed is that it is a conveyance of the grantor's interest in the property described
in the deed, rather than of the property itself. See Greek Catholic Congregation v.
Plummer, 347 Pa. 351, 352, 32 A.2d 299, 300 (1943) (quoting 16 AM. JUR. Deeds
§ 219 (1938)).
16. See Moelle v. Sherwood, 148 U.S. 21 (1893). The Court stated inher alia:
The doctrine expressed in many cases that the grantee in a quitclaim
deed cannot be treated as a bona fide purchaser does not seem to rest upon
any sound principle. It is asserted upon the assumption that the form of the
instrument, that the grantor merely releases to the grantee his claim,
whatever it may be, without any warranty of its value, or only passes
whatever interest he may have at the time, indicates that there may be
other and outstanding claims or interests which may possibly affect the title
of the property, and, therefore, it is said that the grantee, in accepting a
conveyance of that kind, cannot be a bona .fde purchaser and entitled to
protection as such; and that he is in fact thus notified by his grantor that
there may be some defect in his title and he must take it at his risk. This
assumption we do not think justified by the language of such deeds or the
general opinion of conveyancers. There may be many reasons why the
holder of property may refuse to accompany his conveyance of it with an
express warranty of the soundness of its title or its freedom from the claims
of others, or to execute a conveyance in such form as to imply a warranty of
any kind even when the title is known to be perfect.
Id at 28-29.
In 1931 New Jersey specifically directed that a grantee under a quitclaim deed
might qualify as a bona fide purchaser by legislative fiat. See N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 46:5-6 to :5-9 (West 1940).
17. See, e.g., Johnson v. Williams, 37 Kan. 179, 183, 14 P. 537, 539 (1887) (a
grantee of a quitclaim deed is not a bona fide purchaser with respect to outstanding
interests shown by the records, or which are discoverable in making proper examinations and inquiries); Meeks v. Bickford, 96 N.J. Eq. 321, 125 A. 15 (1924)(grantee
under a quitclaim deed was not a bona fide purchaser for value as against a prior
grantee by bargain and sale to the same lands, whose deed was unrecorded, where at
the time the grantor executed the quitclaim deed the grantor had no interest in the
premises).
See MIcH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 565.29 (1967). The Michigan statute reads as
follows:
Every conveyance of real estate within the state hereafter made, which
shall not be recorded as provided in this chapter, shall be void as against
any subsequent purchaser in good faith and for a valuable consideration of
the same real estate or any portion thereof, whose conveyance shall be first
duly recorded. The fact that such first recorded conveyance is in the form
or contains the terms of a deed of quit-claim and release shall not affect the
question of good faith of such subsequent purchaser, or be of itself notice to
him of any unrecorded conveyance of the same real estate or part thereof.
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deed" ' and the "general warranty deed."' 9 The special warranty
deed rendered the grantor responsible for all defects that were created
by the grantor or which arose while the grantor held title. 20 The general warranty deed under the Pennsylvania statute included the five
customary warranties of title described above. 2' Unlike the special
warranty deed, the general warranty deed imposed liability upon the
grantor for defects in title which were created by any predecessor in
22
title, not just those created by the grantor.
The goals of the legislative reforms typified by the Pennsylvania
statute were twofold: (1) to simplify the process of fixing responsibility for defects in title, and (2) to eliminate potential sources of confusion, dispute, and ultimately, litigation. The reformers were only
partially successful in realizing their goals. The introduction of
"magic words" has largely eliminated problems directly related to
construction of language on the face of the deed. Thus, a deed was
deemed a quitclaim deed if the operative words of conveyance were
"release, quitclaim, or discharge;" a special warranty deed if the operative words were "grant or convey;" and a general warranty deed
only if expressly indicated. However, difficult problems relating to
the parameters of the liabilities and responsibilities thereby created
remain as elusive and intractable as ever.
III.

THE EXISTING LAw-A CATALOGUE OF THE
TROUBLING ASPECTS

One of the most troublesome aspects of the present law of warranties of title arises out of the conjunction of the statute of limita-

tions and the limitation of assessment of damages which may
combine to prevent any meaningful recovery beyond a nominal dam-

age award. Consider, for example, the following hypothetical situation which seems neither unique nor rare.

Following a grant to A from 0, it is discovered that B has an
outstanding interest in the property. B takes no steps to enforce his
rights in the land. While the warranties tnfuluro clearly have not been
18. See 21 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6 (Purdon 1955).

19. 21 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5 (Purdon 1955). Many jurisdictions do not
distinguish general and special warranty deeds. In this type ofjurisdiction, liability is
imposed upon the grantor under a warranty deed for all defects regardless of their
source. See generall 20 AM. JUR. 2D Covenants, Conditions, Etc. § 75 (1965).
20. See Clark v. Steele, 255 Pa. 330, 99 A. 1001 (1917).
21. See 21 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5 (Purdon 1955). For a discussion of the five
customary warranties of title, see notes 6-12 and accompanying text supra.
22. See 21 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5 (Purdon 1955).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol29/iss3/2

6

Levin: Warranties of Title - A Modest Proposal
1983-84]

WARRANTIES OF TITLE

breached,23 the warranties th presenti are breached at the moment the
deed is delivered by reason of the defect in title. 24 The existence of a
cause of action by definition creates a present right of suit. Thus, any
statute of limitation applicable to an action for breach of warranty in
25
presenti would begin running at the moment of the conveyance.
This would be so even though there has been no interference with A's
possession or enjoyment of the land and even though there may never
be such an interference. Because the statute of limitation would be
running, A may have to bring suit before his possession is in fact interfered with, or be barred from ever doing so.
The question of damages in a suit by A in the above situation is
particularly troublesome. It may be that A's possession and enjoyment will never be disturbed. A may eliminate the adverse claim
through adverse possession or estoppel. A may also be able to obtain
a quitclaim deed from the holder of the outstanding interest at little
or no cost, thus eliminating the defect in the title. In assessing an
appropriate damage award, how is a court to evaluate such potentialities? Particularly when the warranties involved are those relating to
title rather than encumbrances, there is substantial authority for the
proposition that a grantee is limited to nominal damages unless and
until another party has in fact asserted a right against him.2 6 There23. See notes 9-12 and accompanying text supra. The warranties considered in
futuro are the covenant of warranty and the warranty for quiet enjoyment. Id A
breach of one of the warranties infuturo is established upon proof of acts of disturbance of possession by a holder of lawful paramount title. 20 AM. JUR. 2D Covenants,
Conditions, Etc. § 100 (1965).
24. 20 AM. JUR. 2D Covenants, Conditions, Etc. § 100 (1965). It is generally said
that a covenant inpresentiis broken, if at all, when it is made. Id. The mere existence
of an outstanding paramount title constitutes a breach of the covenant, even without
eviction, so that an immediate right of action accrues in favor of the vendee. Id. See,
e.g., Adams v. Seymour, 191 Va. 372, 61 S.E.2d 23 (1950) (where timber with removal rights had previously been conveyed by a recorded deed, covenant of quiet
possession free from encumbrance was broken when made, and gave rise to a right of
action).
25. See generally Annot., 99 A.L.R. 1050 (1935). There is some conflict as to
when the statute begins to run in cases based on warranties in presenti However, for
purposes of this article, it is important to recognize that most courts have held that if
an encumbrance exists at the time a deed is executed, the covenant against encumbrances is then breached and the statute of limitations begins to run. See id.at 1052.
2d 547, 389 N.E.2d 1188 (1979); Chapman v. Kimball,
See also Brown v. Lober, 75 Ill.
7 Neb. 399 (1878).
26. See Fraser v. Benter, 160 Cal. 390, 119 P. 509 (1911)(in regard to a covenant
against encumbrances, only nominal damages may be recovered for an encumbrance
which causes the grantee no actual injury). But see Fechtner v. Lake County Sav. &
Loan, 66 Ill.
2d 128, 361 N.E.2d 575 (1977)("there exists the possibility that more
than nominal damages may be suffered even though plaintiffs have not been 'disturbed in the title' or 'paid nothing to remove the encumberance' "); Hilliker v. Rueger, 228 N.Y. 11, 126 N.E. 266 (1920)(a covenant of seisin, if it is broken at all, is
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fore, the statute of limitations may bar A's claim before A has an
effective claim to any but nominal damages.
The above result, which prevails under existing law, ignores very
real elements of loss which the grantee may well have suffered upon
discovery of the defect in title. For example, the grantee may not
have a sufficiently marketable title to sell the land. 27 The grantee
may also be effectively precluded from improving the land for fear
that his title to the land may successfully be challenged at a later
date. 28 While the grantee may in certain cases be able to negotiate a
release of the outstanding interest, this option would be unavailable if
the outstanding interest were held by an unascertained or unlocated
party. Contacting the holder of the outstanding interest also involves
a risk of stirring up controversy and may create the potential for
greater economic loss to the grantee.
Courts frequently avoid the injustice of the above result by liberally interpreting the concept of constructive interference with the possessory rights of the grantee, thus enabling the grantee to proceed on
the warranties in futuro. 29 However, this approach is problematic in
broken at the time of the conveyance; in an action for breach of a covenant of seisin
the grantee is not restricted to nominal damages).
27. See, e.g., Hilliker v. Rueger, 228 N.Y. 11, 126 N.E. 266 (1920)(recognizing
that where there is a breach of the covenant of seisin, the grantee may not hold
marketable title necessary to resell the land).
28. This fear is best illustrated through an analogy to zoning requirements,
which, although different in character from encumbrances of title, similarly restrict
unfettered use of property. See, e.g., Morgan v. Veach, 59 Cal. App. 2d 682, 139 P.2d
976 (1943). In Morgan, the court affirmed a mandatory injunction calling for the
removal of a residence that the defendants had knowingly constructed in violation of
set-back requirements. Id. Considering the drastic character of the order and the
expense involved in complying with the order, it reasoned that the Morgan defendants
would not have proceeded to develop the land had they anticipated that the restriction would be enforced. Sinilarly, a grantee of land to which a defect in title adheres
may be wary of developing encumbered property because of fear that a court may
uphold a seemingly minor encumbrance. Such a judicial determination appears particularly probable in this situation, where the grantee is aware of the restriction prior
to the development of the land. See Stewart v. Finkelstone, 206 Mass. 28, 92 N.E. 37
(1910) (set-back restrictions contained in deeds to certain property were in
"perpetuity" and created a right in the nature of an easement; where the defendant
knowingly violated these restrictions and took his chances as to the effect of his conduct, adjoining property owners were entitled to a mandatory injunction requiring
removal of the structure).
29. Traditionally, in order to establish a breach of a warranty tnfuuro, it was
necessary to demonstrate an actual interference with the grantee's property rights.
However, recent decisions indicate that courts no longer require a showing of interference in fact to grant relief. See, e.g., Brown v. Lober, 63 Ill. App. 3d 727, 379
N.E.2d 1354 (1978) (showing of actual eviction not necessary to prove breach of a
covenant of quiet enjoyment), rev'd on other grounds, 75 Il. 2d 547, 389 N.E.2d 1188
(1979)(there must be actual or constructive eviction by paramount titleholder); Foley
v. Smith, 14 Wash. App. 284, 539 P.2d 874 (1975) (where vendor sold land to pur-
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its own right. Liberal interpretation of what is meant by possession
distorts the meaning of the warranty of quiet enjoyment. It also creates uncertainty regarding whether the court will make the leaps necessary in many cases to find an interference with possession.
Moreover, providing a remedy only under the warranties znfuturo ignores both the legislative mandate creating the warranties in presenti
and the very real loss which a grantee may suffer absent actual possessory interference.
The problem of assessing damages becomes even more complex
upon a sale of the land by the grantee. Assume, for example, that the
grantee receives full market value for the land. Should that receipt of
full value be permitted as a defense by the original grantor to show
that the grantee in fact suffered no loss? 30 If the grantee had successfully recovered damages from the grantor previous to the sale by the
grantee, the grantor may proceed against the grantee in restitution
31
for return of the damages previously recovered.
Additional issues regarding damages arise with respect to subsequent purchasers. For example, a subsequent purchaser may wish to
recover damages on the warranties of title in the prior grantor. This
situation will often arise when the subsequent purchaser's grantor is
either not available or is not financially responsible. The subsequent
purchaser may also proceed against the prior grantor if he received
either a quitclaim or special warranty deed from his immediate grantor, and the prior grantor gave a general warranty deed. Under these
circumstances, the traditional wisdom has been to distinquish between the warranties in present, which are breached at the moment of
conveyance, and the warranties znfuturo, which look to a future trigchasers, a subsequent judgment for specific performance by prior purchasers constituted breach of vendor's covenants of warranty and for quiet enjoyment).
30. There appears to be little authority directly on the point of whether the
receipt of full payment of a grantee serves to bar relief from the grantor who
breached his warranty of title. However, such a denial appears reasonable in light of
the general proposition that in assessing damages, "matters that have occurred since
[a] wrongful act. . . and which have operated to lessen the damage resulting therefrom may be shown in mitigation." 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 205 (1965).
31. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF RESTITUTION § 20 (Tent. Draft No. 1,
1983). The Second Restatement provides that where a claimant brings suit for restitution, the claimant must restore to the defendant any benefit resulting from the
circumstances on which the right to restitution is based. Id § 20(1). This section
further provides:
(2) A money judgment for restitution is adjusted so as to reflect any
net benefit resulting from the circumstances on which the right to
restitution is based, to the extent that
(a) the benefit accrued to the claimant, and
(b) he would be unjustly enriched if the defendant were not
credited with it.
Id. § 20(2).
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gering event. 32 Under this approach, warranties tn presenti are
deemed to be purely personal to the immediate grantee since their
breach gives rise to an immediate cause of action. Warranties 1n
futuro, on the other hand, are deemed to be available to whomever
happens to be the owner of the land when the triggering event
occurs.

33

This distinction, labeled as mere "technical scruple" even among
traditionalists, 34 was perhaps valid at the time when the power to
assign choses in action was not generally recognized. 35 However, today there is a virtually universal acceptance of the general power to
assign, 36 and the distinction no longer serves any useful purpose. It is
therefore more in line with contemporary law to find that where a
32. For a discussion of the traditional view of nonassignability of choses in action and its effect on actions for breach of warranties of title, see notes 33-37 and
accompanying text infra. But see4J. KENT, COMMENTARIES *460(1830). In rejecting
this absolute distinction between warranties in presenti and warranties infuturo, Kent
opined that the refusal to permit warranties in presenti constituted a "mere technical
scruple." Id Kent reasoned that the right to bring a cause of action due to a breach
of covenant, whether present or prospective, should be available to an assignee, because the assignee "is the most interested, and the most fit person to claim the indemnity secured by [the covenants], for the compensation belongs to him, as the last
purchaser, and the first sufferer." Id
33. 4 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES *459(1830). Kent wrote:
The covenants of seisin, and of a right to convey and against encumbrances,
are personal covenants, not running with the land, or passing to the assignee; for, if not true, there is a breach of them as soon as the deed is
executed, and they become choses in action, which are not technically assignable. But the covenant of warranty, and the covenant for quiet enjoyment,
are prospective, and an actual ouster or eviction is necessary to constitute a
breach of them. They are, therefore, in the nature of real covenants, and
they run with the land conveyed, and descend to heirs, and vest in assignees
or the purchaser.
Id (footnote omitted). For additional discussion concerning the viability of actions
against remote grantors, see 20 AM. JUR. 2D Covenants, Conditions, Etc. § 164 (1965).
Not all decisions follow the traditional distinction between warranties in presenti and
warranties infuturo for determining whether a purchaser can bring an action against a
remote grantor. See, e.g., Schofield v. The Iowa Homestead Co., 32 Iowa 317 (1871)
(court determined that the covenant of seisin, although theoretically a covenant in
presenti, runs with the land, and confers upon the last grantee a right of action
thereon).
34. For a discussion of the origins of this label, see note 33 supra. It is not surprising to find that American courts which refuse to apply this distinction and hence
allow a purchaser to bring suit against a remote grantor have picked up on Chancellor Kent's less-than-favorable label for the distinction. See, e.g., Schoftd, 32 Iowa at
319 (1871) ("Chancellor Kent . . . admits that the American doctrine is supported
upon a 'technical scruple,' and assigns the most conclusive reasons in support of the
opposite English rule").
35. See generally A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 856 (1952) ("choses in

action" were not assignable at common law, a tradition which continued into the
beginning of the twentieth century).
36. See id Corbin traces the historical development of the recognition that assignments are legally operative and enforceable. See also RESTATEMENT OF CON-
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grantor transfers his entire interest in land, an assignment of his rights
against his transferor ought to be inferred absent evidence on the face
of the transferee's deed of a contrary intent. If less than all of the
transferor's title is conveyed, then a pro tanto assignment should be
inferred. At least one court has in fact taken this position. 3 7 However,
38
many courts are reluctant to recognize the rights of remote grantees.
This reluctance might be based upon unspoken considerations which
would well transcend the so-called technical scruple.
A hypothetical scenario illustrates the reasons for some of this
judicial reluctance. Assume that 0 conveys land to A by a warranty
deed. A discovers that the title is defective and successfully sues 0 in
a state which permits recovery for the actual value of the defect
though there has been no actual interference with A's possession. A
thereafter sells the same property to B for its full value. A has thus
recouped a double recovery. Assume further that B's possession is
later actually interfered with and B brings an action against 0 for
breach of the warranty of quiet enjoyment. The question then arises
as to whether B should be permitted to seek the same damages which
A had previously recovered from 0. If (1) the covenants in presentiare
treated as creating a distinct and separate cause of action from the
covenants infuturo, and (2) the covenants infuturo are available to future owners who own the land at the time they accrue, then there
would appear to be no available legal concept which would prevent
0 from being liable a second time for the same loss. 39 It is true that 0
might have a theoretical right of restitution against A, 40 and B might
have a separate independent action against A, depending on the
character of A's deed. 4 1 However, these rights, even if they exist, may
148-177 (1933); Corbin, Assignment of Contract Rights, 74 U. PA. L. REv.
207 (1926).
37. See Schofield v. The Iowa Homestead Co., 32 Iowa 317 (1871). In Schofield,
the primary question before the Iowa court was whether a covenant of seisin runs
with land. Id at 318. The grantor of land, who gave the covenant, defended on the
grounds that prior to the commencement of the instant action, the plaintiff-grantee
sold for value a portion of the land to a third party, and that the subsequent purchaser of the portion was barred from recovering upon the covenant. Id Upon concluding that the covenant runs with the land, the Iowa court stated that "covenants
running with the land are susceptible to division, so that if the land be conveyed in
parcels to several persons, each may maintain an action upon the covenant to recover
for the land in which he has an interest." Id at 321.
38. For citations to cases illustrating this judicial reluctance, see note 39 in)fra.
39. See Williams v. O'Donnell, 225 Pa. 321, 74 A. 205 (1909); Robinson v. Gallagher, 26 N.J. 59, 138 A.2d 726 (1958).
40. For a brief discussion of the grantor's potential rights of restitution, see note
31 and accompanying text supra.
41. For a discussion of the different categories of deeds, see notes 14-22 and accompanying text supra.
TRACTS, §§
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be meaningless if A is no longer available or if he is judgment-proof.
This dilemma could be avoided by denying recovery for breach of
any of the warranties in presenit' thereby limiting recovery to the
owner whose possession is actually interfered with by the breach. Another possible solution to this problem is to limit the extent to which
42
the remote party may recover on warranties of his predecessor.
Some attempts to solve the problem of the potential double liability of 0 could lead to results which are as unsatisfactory as those
sought to be avoided. For example, in the hypothetical set forth
above, if the party with the adverse claim never interferes with the
owner and no action for the warranties infuturo ever accrues, neither
A nor B may establish any right of recovery; A, because he has sus44
tained no loss, 4 3 and B, because no cause of action accrued to him.
This is true even though, as previously noted, a very real injury may
45
have resulted from the lost opportunity to improve the property.
The difficulties underlying the situation outlined above arise out
of three interrelated problems. First, courts fail to recognize that, regardless of whether liabilities are expressed in terms of one covenant
of title or five covenants of title, there is in fact only a single underlying liability. Second, the courts have failed to develop a flexible
method of measuring damages for a defect or a failure of title when
42. Under the approach taken by many courts, recovery for breach of the warranty in presenti may be had upon a mere showing of constructive interference. By
denying recovery under the warranties in presenti, courts can ensure that only those
grantees who have suffered actual interference may recover damages. For a discussion of the concept of constructive interference, see note 29 and accompanying text
supra.

43. Under the suggested solution, A would not be able to recover because in
order to preclude double liability of 0, it is posited that recovery be denied where the
eviction was merely constructive. See note 29 supra. A, the immediate grantee, therefore would not have suffered any loss for which he could recover because there was no
actual interference with A's possession.
44. If there has been no interference by the party holding the outstanding claim,
the warranties infuluro have not been breached. It is only these warranties which give
a cause of action to subsequent owners of property. Alternatively, the warranties in
presentihave theoretically been breached by the mere existence of outstanding title at
the time of the conveyance from 0 to A. However, B cannot bring suit based upon
this breach, because warranties in presentiare purely personal, giving rise to a cause of
action only in the immediate grantee. For a discussion of the warranties in presenti,
see notes 7-9 and accompanying text supra.
45. See, e.g., Hilliker v. Rueger, 228 N.Y. 11, 126 N.E. 266 (1920) (a prior restriction upon title may result in a loss of marketable title). An example of the type of loss
a grantee may suffer without experiencing actual possessory interference is a grantee
discovering that his property is subject to a restrictive covenant or to a reversionary
interest, such as a right of reentry or the possibility of reverter which has not yet
ripened. No actual interference may occur within the limitations period in which to
bring suit for breach of warranties in presentt Thus, only by risking forfeiture of his
property may the owner establish a cause of action with the possibility of recovering
real damages.
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there has been no interference with the holder's rights. Third, courts
have failed to deal realistically with the question of who is the appropriate party to bring the action when the original grantee conveys the
property to another.
The Commissioners on Uniform Laws have proposed some degree of reform in this area. 46 Under the Uniform Land Transactions
Act (the Act), warranties of title are for the benefit of subsequent parties in the absence of express agreement to the contrary. 47 This is true
without regard to whether the particular covenant of title is classified
as in presenti or infuturo.48 While this aspect of the Act is certainly a
positive reform, the Act fails to address the evaluation of damages
when there has not yet been interference with the possessory rights of
the plaintiff. Similarly, the drafters of the Act did not attempt to
solve the problem of multiple liability which arises when the rights to
enforce warranties i'n presenti and warranties infuturo vest in different
persons. As long as the various warranties of title are viewed as creating separate and distinct bases for liability, the risk of a seller being
exposed to double liability seems unavoidable. Indeed, since the Act
46. See generally UNIF. LAND TRANSACTIONS ACT, 13 U.L.A. 545 (1980).

47. UNIF. LAND TRANSACTIONS ACT § 2-306, 13 U.L.A. 545, 605 (1980). The
Uniform Act provides:
A seller who executes a deed that does not provide to the contrary impliedly
warrants that:
(1) the real estate is free from all encumbrances;
(2) the buyer will have quiet and peaceable possession of or right to enjoy
the real estate conveyed;
(3) the seller has power and right to convey the title which he purports to
convey; and
(4) the seller will defend the title to real estate conveyed against all persons lawfully claiming it.
Id. The Uniform Act further provides that the seller's warranty of title, as set forth
above, extends to the buyer's successors in title. Id § 2-312, 13 U.L.A. at 615.
48. Id § 2-312, 13 U.L.A. at 615. This section provides:
(a) A seller's warranty of title extends to the buyer's successors in title.
(b) Notwithstanding any agreement that only the immediate buyer has
the benefit of warranties of quality with respect to the real estate or
that warranties received by a prior seller do not pass to the buyer, a
conveyance of real estate transfers to the buyer all warranties of quality made by prior sellers. However, any rights the seller has against a
prior seller for loss incurred before the conveyance may be reserved by
the seller expressly or by implication from the circumstances.
(c) A seller's warranty of quality to a protected party extends to any successor in title of the protected party unaffected by any disclaimer or
limitation of liability of which the successor had no reason to know at
the time of the conveyance to the successor. A successor has reason to
know of a disclaimer or limitation of liability if it appears in a recorded deed or other recorded document granting the real estate to the
protected party.
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retains the traditional covenants of title, 49 the implications inherent
in the traditional law, including the risk of double liability, remain
unaffected. Since the Act is founded in large measure upon traditional concepts, it appears that most of the difficulties created by the
traditional concepts and distinctions remain unresolved by the Act.
Perhaps it is not undesirable that to date no state has adopted the
Act. 50
IV.

A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE

In light of the various problems which exist in the law of warranties of title, a more complete solution than that offered by the Act
appears necessary. 51 Legal concepts extant in other areas of the law
provide a basis for developing (by way of analogy) a more realistic set
of criteria for dealing with the questions which arise from warranties
of title.
Initially, the law should recognize as a truism that any defect in
title creates but a single cause of action; a single basis for liability
exists regardless of whether such liability is expressed in terms of one,
two, or five different warranties of title. In this connection, it is suggested that all legal distinction between so-called warranties inpreenti
and warranties infuluro be abolished. In reality, both types of warranties are descriptions of precisely the same liability. Under this suggested formulation, whether the plaintiff's enjoyment of the property
has been actually interfered with would remain relevant. It would,
however, be regarded as merely one factor in the evaluation of damages, rather than as determinative of the existence of a cause of action
or of the right to any damages at all. The plaintiff should determine
the point at which he pursues his remedy and seeks to establish his
loss, similar to the plaintiffs election of remedy in other areas of the
law.

52

The running of the statute of limitations should not be determined by the character of the remedy sought, or by assigning a time
to the so-called accrual of the cause of action. Rather, commencement of the statutory period should turn upon the reasonableness of
49. For the language of the Uniform Act which preserves the traditional covenants, see note 47 supra.
50. See U.L.A. MASTER ED. 9-78 (1984) (indicating by listing uniform acts
which states have enacted that this Act has not yet been adopted by any jurisdiction).
51. For a discussion of the formula contained in the Uniform Land Transactions
Act, see note 47 and accompanying text supra.
52. See generally 25 AM. JUR. 2D Elections of Remedis § 1 (1966) ("purpose of the
doctrine of election of remedies is not to prevent recourse to any remedy, but to
prevent double redress for a single wrong").
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the plaintiffs action or inaction. In other words, just as in the case of
ex deh'clu actions such as conspiracy, which are concealed by their very
nature, the limitations period should run from the time that the
plaintiff either knows, or by due diligence, should have known, of the
53
existence of his rights.
This statute of limitations rule should, however, be subject to the
qualification that once a party's cause of action is barred, no subsequent party should be able to proceed upon the same cause of action.
Similarly, once the statute of limitations begins to run against a
party, it should continue to run against a transferee even if the transferee does not have actual knowledge of the existence of the cause of
action. The above are simply applications of the familiar doctrine
that an assignee will normally have no greater rights that his transferor, and that a transferee normally assumes the risks relating to the
54
rights of his transferor.
In connection with the measure of damages, it is unrealistic to
allow recovery only of nominal damages in all cases in which there
has been no interference with the plaintiffs possessory rights. As previously noted, very real and substantial injury may result without actual interference. 55 No convincing justification has ever been
advanced for denying the plaintiff the opportunity to prove actual
losses. While a plaintiff could prove his actual damage with more
certainty by showing either that his title has actually been interfered
with or that he has negotiated a settlement with the owner of an outstanding interest and thereby liquidated his damage, 56 such proof
should be at the option of the plaintiff. Considerable precedent exists
in other areas of the law for allowing recovery of equally uncertain
53. For cases applying the proposed rule in other areas of law, see, e.g., Prince v.
Trustees of Univ. of Pa., 282 F. Supp. 832 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (malpractice-negligence
cause of action did not accrue until allegedly harmful results of injection were discovered or becomes discoverable); Keating v. Zemel, 281 Pa. Super. 129, 421 A.2d 1181
(1980)(where culpability cannot be discovered at time it occurs, the statute of limitations begins to run as of the date the culpability could reasonably have been
discovered).
54. See 6 AM. JUR. 2D Assignment § 2 (1966); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 336 comment b, illustration 3 (1979) (as the assignment of a right ordinarily transfers only what the assignor has, the assignee's rights are subject to defenses,
including the statute of limitations, that would have been available had there been
no assignment).
55. For a discussion of the loss that may be suffered by a grantee due to an
encumbrance upon title even in the absence of an actual interference, see notes 27-28
and accompanying text supra.
56. See, e.g, Adams v. Seymour, 191 Va. 372, 61 S.E.2d 23 (1950) (recovery allowed against grantor for payments made by grantee in settlement with third parties
for interference with their possession where grantor conveyed without notice of sale of
timber of the land).
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damages. One example is recovery in personal injury cases of damages for future pain and suffering, lost future wages or earning capacity and future medical expenses. 57 Similarly, in contract cases it is
sometimes possible for a plaintiff to recover for lost profits. 58 By the
same reasoning, it is possible for a finder of fact to evaluate, in the
case of a potentially defective title, the likelihood of the adverse claim
being asserted and the value of the loss from the resulting inability to
improve or sell the property.
The problem of potential multiple plaintiffs can similarly be
solved. Initially, it should be noted that whether a right of action
shall pass from its original owner to his purchaser can be provided for
by express agreement. 59 Even absent an express agreement, however,
there exists ample authority upon which a workable set of rules may
be constructed. A hypothetical involving chattels is instructive. Assume a case in which property to which there are multiple rights of
ownership is tortiously damaged or destroyed. Under present practice, the plaintiff with the primary interest in the damaged chattel
will frequently be given the power to act as trustee for all outstanding
interests, subject to a duty to account for any losses to those interests.
This solution is commonly employed in the law of bailments. The
bailee normally recovers damages not only for himself but also for his
bailor. 60 In an analogous factual situation in which title to real property is defective, a present title holder could act in a capacity similar
to that of the bailee, and bring an action on his own behalf as well as
on behalf of any prior owner able to establish a separate individual
loss. The prior owner could prove such loss either by intervening in
the principal suit or by bringing a separate action against the original
6
plaintiff for a share of the damages awarded. '
If the present property owner fails to bring suit within a specified
period of time, then just as the bailor may bring his own action and
57. See generally 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages §§ 309-313 (1966).
58. See, e.g., Western Show Co. v. Mix, 315 Pa. 139, 173 A. 183 (1934) (recovery
for lost future profits allowed).
59. See, e.g., UNIF. LAND TRANSACTIONS AcT § 2-312(b), 13 UL.A. 615 (1980).
60. See generally W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS at 94-96 (4th ed. 1979). Prosser
states that at early common law recovery in trover was conditioned upon the plaintiff
proving he was in possession of the goods at the time of the loss. Bailees under this
view were held to be able to recover the full value of chattels which were damaged
while in their possession. Id See also Warren, Qualifyng as P/laini~ft n an Action for
Conversion, 49 HARv. L. REV. 1084, 1097 (1936).
For a general discussion of the law of bailments, see 8 AM. JUR, 2D Bailments § 1
(1980).
61. An example of a separate loss suffered by a prior owner would be if that
owner had been compelled to sell at a price below the market value by reason of the
title defect. For other examples, see notes 27-28 and accompanying text supra.
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establish his own loss, so too might the prior owner bring an action in
his own right. In any event, since there is but a single loss, a single
recovery should be permitted no matter which party actually brings
the action.
It would be possible for the proposed changes to be made judicially. However, in view of the considerable alteration required in
doctrinal thought and the chronic judicial conservatism with respect
to property rights, it is preferable that the reform of the law take legislative form. Because the proposed reform attempts to clarify the
probable intent of the parties rather than to alter their substantive
rights in the property, application of the reform to preexisting deeds
does not jeopardize vested rights. 62 On a practical level, retroactive
application of the reform would enable the much needed change to
take effect without a lengthy waiting period before all existing deeds
are transferred. Moreover, retroactive application of a rule designed
to clarify present intent and present expectations raises no serious
63
constitutional problems.
V.

CONCLUSION

While the elimination of all litigation in the area is a goal unlikely to be achieved, an adoption of the ideas suggested in this article
would furnish a firm basis for the development of a realistic, internally consistent and flexible body of law for dealing with the
problems which exist in this area of law. The following appendix
contains a proposal for a legislative enactment to implement the ideas
herein suggested.
62. For a general discussion concerning retroactive application of statutory reform, see Levin, Section 6104(d) of the Pennsylvania Rule Against Perpetuites: The Valdidty
and Efect of the Retroactve Application of Property and Probate Law Reform, 25 VILL. L.
REV. 213 (1980).
63. The unfortunate situation of delayed reform was present in the area of apportionment of trust estates, and for many years the rules governing apportionment
into principle and income varied according to what statute was in force at the time
the trust was created. Compare In re Crawford's Estate, 362 Pa. 458, 67 A.2d 124
(1949)(where the Principal and Income Act of 1947, repealing the Uniform Principal
and Income Act of 1945, was a substantial re-enactment thereof, the Act of 1945
must be construed as continuing in active operation) with In re Pew's Estate, 362 Pa.
468, 67 A.2d 129 (1949) (the provisions of the Uniform Principal and Income Act of
1945 and of the Principal and Income Act of 1947 are unconstitutional when applied
to trusts created before their enactments).
This state of affairs was resolved with the overruling of the Crawford and Pew
decisions. See In re Catherwood's Trust, 405 Pa. 61, 173 A.2d 86 (1961).
In
Catherwood's Trust, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined that the terms of the
Uniform Principle and Income Act applied retroactively to all trusts, regardless of
when they were created, so long as the apportionable event occurred after the effective date of the Act. Id
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APPENDIX
PROPOSED LEGISLATION
Section 1. Legislative Purpose
The purpose of this statute is to define the obligations of a grantor of real property to a grantee and to subsequent grantees for defects in the title conveyed.
Section 2. Definitions
As used in this Act, the term
(a)

"Quitclaim Deed" means
(1) any deed so labelled; or
(2) any deed in which the words for transfer are limited to
"quitclaim," "release," or "discharge."

(b)

"Special Warranty Deed" means
(1) any deed so labeled; or
(2) any deed in which the words for transfer are "grant,"
''convey," or "transfer;" or
(3) any deed which does not indicate what type of deed is
intended.

(c)

"General Warranty Deed" means
(1) any deed so labelled; or
(2) any deed in which the grantor clearly indicates on the
face of the deed that he intends to assume liability for
all defects in title whether created by him or his predecessor in title.

Obligations of a Grantor Who Conveys by a Quitclaim
Deed
A grantor who conveys real property by a Quitclaim Deed shall
not be subject to any liability under this Act.
The acceptance of a Quitclaim Deed by the grantee shall not
affect the right of the grantee
(a) to succeed to any rights of the grantor; or
(b) to rely on any benefits accruing to him as a bona fide purchaser under the Recording Act or any other rule of the
common law.
Section 3.

Section 4.

Obligations of a Grantor Who Conveys by a Special
Warranty Deed
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(a)

A grantor who conveys real property by a Special Warranty
Deed is liable to
(1) the grantee; and
(2) all subsequent grantees taking the land, or any portion
of the land in the proportion that the value of such
portion transferred bears to the value of the entire
property, BUT ONLY in the absence of an express
contrary provision in the subsequent deed.
(b) A grantor under this section shall be liable for
(1) any encumbrance not excepted in the deed; and
(2) any defect in title, PROVIDED THAT such encumbrance or defect arose out of the acts of the grantor or
arose during the period of time during which the grantor held title to, or was in possession of, the property.
Section 5. Obligations of Grantor Who Conveys by a General Warranty Deed
(a) A grantor who conveys real property by a General Warranty Deed is liable to
(1) the grantee; and
(2) all subsequent grantees taking the land, or any portion
of the land in the proportion that the value of such
portion transferred bears to the value of the entire
property, BUT ONLY in the absence of an express
contrary provision in the subsequent deed.
(b) A grantor under this section shall be liable for
(1) any encumbrance not excepted in the deed; and
(2) any defect in title.
(c) A grantor under this section shall be liable regardless of
whether the encumbrance or defect arose out of the acts of
the grantor or out of the acts of his predecessors in title, and
regardless of when the encumbrance or defect arose.
Section 6. Breach of the Grantor's Obligations
(a) Except to the extent that the deed expressly exempts the
grantor's obligation, a grantor who conveys by Special
Warranty Deed or by General Warranty Deed shall be
deemed to be in breach of his obligations in the following
situations:
(1) title was subject to an easement or equitable servitude;
or
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title was subject to any mortgage, judgment or any
other monetary claim of any type; or
(3) title is any interest other than a fee simple absolute; or
(4) title is subject to a reasonable claim of adverse possession, forgery, unauthorized signature, lack of operative
delivery of any other prior deed, or any other basis for
avoiding the title of any grantor or of his predecessor.
A grantor may be liable under this section regardless of
whether the grantee's possession and enjoyment are interfered with by the situations listed in Section (a) (1)-(4).
(2)

(b)

(c)

For the purposes of this section, any grantee or his successors in interest whose interest has been interfered with may
attempt to establish any loss or damage reasonably related
to and caused by the breach through any relevant evidence,
regardless of whether the grantee or successor in interest is
in possession of the property.

Section 7. Limitations of Action
All actions under this Act must be brought within six (6) years of
such time as the plaintiff discovers or, by reasonable diligence, should
discover, the existence of the cause of action. Anything to the contrary notwithstanding, no person shall have the power to transfer any
greater rights than he has. If a right has not been totally barred, but
the period of limitations has begun to run, then the right of action of
the transferree shall be barred at the same time as that of the transferor as though there had been no such transfer.
Section 8. Standing to Sue
(a) The present owner of land conveyed shall have the right to
recover from any prior party who has given a warranty
deed which has been deemed breached for all losses occasioned by the breach. The right of such present owner shall
be subject to the right of any prior owner to intervene to
establish his individual loss, or to bring an appropriate action for an accounting for his portion of the loss against the
current owner who has collected on such breach of
warranties.
(b) Any prior owner who has suffered a loss due to any breach
of a warranty deed may make a written request to the present owner to bring proceedings against the breaching party.
In the event that the present owner fails to bring such an
action within thirty (30) days of such written request, the
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prior party may bring an action to recover for his loss. Recovery by such prior party shall be a pro lanto defense to any
subsequent action against the breaching party based on his
obligations of title in his deed.
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